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Abstract
In order to develop a proof procedure of multi-agent autoepistemic Logic (MAEL),
a natural framework to formalize belief and reasoning including inheritance, persis-
tence, and causality, we introduce a method that translates a MAEL theory into a
logic program with integrity constraints. It is proved that there exists one-to-one
correspondence between extensions of a MAEL theory and stable models of a logic
program translated from it. Our approach has the following advantages: (1) We
can obtain all extensions of a MAEL theory if we compute all stable models of the
translated logic program. (2) We can fully use eﬃcient techniques or systems for
computing stable models of a logic program. We also investigate the properties of
reasoning in MAEL through this translation. The fact that the extension computing
problem can be reduced to the stable model computing problem implies that there
are close relationships between MAEL and other formalizations of nonmonotonic
reasoning.
1 Introduction
It is well known that there are diﬃcult problems such as multi-extension
problem[3,17] and temporal projection problem[5] which state that undesir-
able reasoning results could arise simultaneously when we formalize belief by
using nonmonotonic logics.
As a method to handle such problems in the framework of formal logic,
multi-agent autoepistemic logic (MAEL)[19] has been proposed. MAEL is
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formalized by extending autoepistemic logic (AEL)[13] to the one with multi-
modality and multi-theory, where belief acquisition relations between agents
and their priorities can be speciﬁed by formulas. Thus, MAEL is a so ﬂexi-
ble framework that we can naturally represent belief and reasoning including
inheritance, persistence, and causality[19].
Since it is required to realize a belief processing system based on MAEL,
an eﬃcient theorem proof procedure for it (computation method of extensions
of a theory) should be developed. The procedures proposed in [6,7] were based
on the tableau method combined with resolution principle. However, it only
determines whether a given formula may be contained in the reasoning results
derived from the initial belief set and it is not easy to obtain whole results
of the reasoning (what and how many result sets are derived from the initial
belief set). Therefore, it is a fundamental issue to develop a new proof proce-
dure for MAEL in which all reasoning results can be obtained, and it is also
important to clarify the properties of reasoning in MAEL.
In order to model the reasoning systems based on incomplete belief or com-
mon sense knowledge, the following formalizations of nonmonotonic reasoning
have been proposed so far: default logic, NML, AEL, and circumscription,
logic programming, truth maintenance system (TMS), and abduction, etc.
Although these formalizations have been proposed from diﬀerent backgrounds
and motivations, it was shown in various researches that they are closely re-
lated to each other[2,4,8,9,11,12,14]. In particular, stable model semantics[4]
which was proposed as declarative semantics of logic programs is constituted
by applying the concept of stability of a theory in AEL. Gelfond[4] has shown
that a logic program with stable model semantics can be regarded as a the-
ory of AEL with restricted syntax. This means that a logic program can be
interpreted in AEL through the translation to a theory of AEL.
In this paper, we show that the inverse translation to Gelfond’s result is
also possible, i.e., the translation of a theory of AEL into a logic program with
stable model semantics, and also that the translation can be extended to the
multi-agent system, i.e., MAEL.
In the light of the goal to realize a reasoning system based on MAEL, this
translation is important at the following two points:
• This translation can be used as a new theorem proof procedure for MAEL.
A concrete method of translating a theory of MAEL into a logic program is
given in this paper, where one-to-one correspondence between the reasoning
results before and after the translation is guaranteed. Thus, if a theory of
MAEL is once translated into a logic program and stable models of it are
computed, we can obtain extensions of the theory. This suggests that it
comes to be able to carry out direct use of the research results and the
existing systems about the computation of stable models in the theorem
proof of MAEL. Moreover, we can obtain all extensions of the theory if all
the stable models of the translated logic program are computed.
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• This translation shows clearly that two diﬀerent formalizations of nonmono-
tonic reasoning, MAEL and logic programming, are closely related. The
result of this paper shows that MAEL can be characterized in terms of logic
programming which is a simpler formalization of nonmonotonic reasoning
if the translation rule is described appropriately. The attempt to under-
stand MAEL from a simpler formalization is useful when we investigate the
properties of the reasoning formalized in MAEL. Also, this suggests the
possibility of logic programming as a fundamental language which describes
nonmonotonic reasoning systems for multi-agents.
In order to enable this translation, the following two problems are to be
solved:
• How to translate a theory of MAEL which was extended to describe a multi-
agent system into a single agent’s theory, and how to obtain expressions in
a logic program.
• How to describe each agent’s reasoning capability (classically logical reason-
ing capability and autoepistemic reasoning capability) which are formalized
in MAEL in terms of rules of a logic program.
In this paper, we show that these problems are solved and that the translation
from a theory of MAEL into a logic program is possible.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys def-
initions and characterizations about MAEL. Also deﬁnitions about a logic
program including integrity constrains and stable model semantics are de-
scribed. In Section 3, a ﬁxed point called an extension base is deﬁned, which
characterizes an extension of a MAEL theory. The extension base will be a
ﬁnite ﬁxed point set if a theory is a ﬁnite set. Section 4 shows how to trans-
late a MAEL theory into a logic program including integrity constraints. The
reasoning results before and after the translation (extensions and stable mod-
els) have one-to-one correspondence. In Section 5, we have discussions on the
properties of the reasoning in MAEL and relations to the previous studies.
Section 6 shows conclusions of this paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Multi-Agent Autoepistemic Logic
MAEL[19] is a nonmonotonic logic for multi-agent systems and is formalized
by extending AEL[13] to the one with multi-modality and multi-theory. It
characterizes belief states which an agent can obtain by propositional reason-
ing and autoepistemic reasoning in multi-agent systems. A set of formulas
Lmael of MAEL is constructed from the set of propositional formulas L0 and
modal operators Li(i = 1, . . . , n) in a usual way. A formula Lip denotes a
meta belief that agent i has a belief p (or, agent i believes p). A theory is a
n-tuple T = (T1, . . . , Tn) of formula sets, where Ti denotes a set of beliefs of
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agent i.
An agent formalized in MAEL is assumed to be ideal on the capability of
logical reasoning and autoepistemic reasoning in the following way:
• Logical reasoning capability: each agent is logically omniscient and his
beliefs are closed under propositionally logical consequence.
• Autoepistemic reasoning capability: Belief acquisition from agents is
formalized in terms of autoepistemic reasoning in multi-agent systems, i.e.,
each agent can obtain a meta belief Lip if agent i has a belief p, and each
agent can obtain a meta belief ¬Lip if agent i does not have a belief p.
If initial belief states of each agent are given, MAEL characterizes ﬁnal be-
lief states (an extension of a theory) which are obtained by the propositionally
logical reasoning and the autoepistemic reasoning.
Deﬁnition 2.1 An ordinal atomic formula is a propositional variable in L0.
A modal atomic formula is a formula of the form Lip where p is a formula. An
atomic formula is either an ordinal atomic formula or a modal one. Atomic
formulas and their negations are called literals.
Deﬁnition 2.2 A propositional interpretation I is a usual assignment of truth
values to formulas. If I assings true to a formula p, we denote I |= p. A
propositional interpretation which assigns true to each element of a set of
formulas Pi is a propositional model of Pi.
Since a modal atomic formula Lip is treated as like a new propositional
variable in a propositional interpretation, its truth value does not depend
on the value of p. Thus, we deﬁne an interpretation which reﬂects intended
meaning of Lip.
Deﬁnition 2.3 An autoepistemic interpretation with respect to a theory T =
(T1, . . . , Tn) is a propositional interpretation I which satisﬁes
I |= Lip iﬀ p ∈ Ti (i = 1, . . . , n)
for any formula p. An autoepistemic interpretation with respect to T which
assigns true to each element of a set of formulas Pi is an autoepistemic model
of Pi with respect to T .
Next, we deﬁne a logical consequence relation |=T in terms of the autoepis-
temic model.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Let Pi be a set of formulas and T = (T1, . . . , Tn) be a theory.
Then, for a formula p, Pi |=T p if I |= p for any autoepistemic model I of Pi
with respect to T .
We deﬁne an extension of a theory which is considered to be a reasoning
result (a set of theorem) in MAEL.
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Deﬁnition 2.5 Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a theory. A theory T = (T1, . . . , Tn)
which satisﬁes
Ti = {q ∈ Lmael | Pi |=T q} (i = 1, . . . , n)
is an extension of P .
From this deﬁnition, 0 or more extensions may exist for a theory in general.
Deﬁnition 2.6 A theory T = (T1, . . . , Tn) is stable if it satisﬁes the following
conditions (1)–(3) for any i (i = 1, . . . , n):
(1) Ti is closed under propositional consequence.
(2) If p ∈ Ti, then Lip ∈ Tj for any j (j = 1, . . . , n).
(3) If p /∈ Ti, then ¬Lip ∈ Tj for any j (j = 1, . . . , n).
It is known that an extension of a theory is stable[19].
2.2 Knowledge Representation based on MAEL
As an application of MAEL, a method to represent inheritance of knowledge
is proposed in [19] where a class of knowledge in the taxonomic hierarchy is
regarded as an agent. When beliefs of agent i are inherited from beliefs of
agent j, a formula of the form
Ljp ∧ ¬Li¬p ⊃ p
is given to a set of initial beliefs Pi of agent i, where p is a belief to be inherited.
We can read this formula as follows: if agent i obtain both a meta belief that
agent j has a belief p and a meta belief that agent i does not have any belief
that is inconsistent to p, then agent i can obtain a belief p.
Example 2.7 Consider the following beliefs (“Nixon Diamond”) which arise
multiple inheritance of attributes: “A quaker is a paciﬁst.”, “A republican is
not a paciﬁst.”, “Nixon is a quaker.”, “Nixon is a republican.” These beliefs
can be represented by MAEL. Let agent 1, 2, 3 be attribute holders of a
quaker, a republican, and Nixon, respectively. Then, as initial belief states of
the agents, we describe a theory P = (P1, P2, P3) as follows:
P1 = {Paciﬁst} ,
P2 = {¬Paciﬁst} ,
P3 = {L1p ∧ ¬L3¬p ⊃ p, L2p ∧ ¬L3¬p ⊃ p} ,
where p is an arbitrary formula. Formulas in P3 denote that Nixon inherits
attributes of both quakers and republicans.
The theory P has two extensions, T = (T1, T2, T3) and T
′ = (T ′1, T
′
2, T
′
3),
where Paciﬁst ∈ T3, while ¬Paciﬁst ∈ T ′3. That is, we can obtain two reasoning
results “Nixon is a paciﬁst” and “Nixon is not a paciﬁst” which contradict each
other. Thus, by using MAEL, we can represent beliefs so that two or more
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reasoning results may be obtained without making a theory contradictory
when competition about reasoning between agents arises.
2.3 Normal Forms of MAEL
We show that any formula of MAEL can be translated into clausal form and
normal form.
Deﬁnition 2.8 A formula of the following form is in clausal form.
L1a1,1 ∧ . . . ∧ L1a1,l(1) ∧ ¬L1b1,1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬L1b1,m(1) ∧ . . .∧
Lnan,1 ∧ . . . ∧ Lna1,l(n) ∧ ¬Lnbn,1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Lnbn,m(n) ⊃ c,
where ai,j, bi,j, c ∈ L0, and each element of the conjunction in the antecedent
may not exist. A theory which is a n-tuple of a set of clausal form formulas
is also called to be in clausal form.
The next theorem[16] gives an algorithm which translates any formula into
a clausal form, that is, by applying (1)–(7) to each formula in the left to right
direction repeatedly, we can obtain its clausal form.
Theorem 2.9 For an interpretation I with respect to any stable theory T =
(T1, . . . , Tn), the following equivalence (1)–(7) hold for any formulas p, q:
(1) I |= Li(p ∧ q) iﬀ I |= Lip ∧ Liq ,
(2) I |= LiLip iﬀ I |= Lip ,
(3) I |= LjLip iﬀ I |= Lip ∨ Lj⊥ (i = j) ,
(4) I |= Lj¬Lip iﬀ I |= ¬Lip ∨ Lj⊥ ,
(5) I |= Li(Lip ∨ q) iﬀ I |= Lip ∨ Liq ,
(6) I |= Lj(Lip ∨ q) iﬀ I |= Lip ∨ Ljq ∨ Lj⊥ (i = j) ,
(7) I |= Lj(¬Lip ∨ q) iﬀ I |= ¬Lip ∨ Ljq ∨ Lj⊥ ,
where ⊥ is a special variable which denotes inconsistency.
Note that (4) and (7) also hold even if i = j.
This translation is illustrated in Fig. 1 where P,Q,R are propositional vari-
ables. A theory whose elements are obtained by this translation is in clausal
form. From the fact that extensions of a theory are stable and the above the-
orem that shows formulas are equivalent through the translation, Ogawa[16]
has shown that we can translate any theory into clausal form without changing
its extensions.
Deﬁnition 2.10 A formula of the following form is in normal form:
L1a1 ∧ ¬L1b1,1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬L1b1,m(1) ∧ . . .∧
Lnan ∧ ¬Lnbn,1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Lnbn,m(n) ⊃ c,
59
Toyma, Kojima and Inagaki
L1((L2P ∧Q) ∨ ¬L1P ) ∨R
↓
L1((L2P ∨ ¬L1P ) ∧ (Q ∨ ¬L1P )) ∨R
↓
(L1(L2P ∨ ¬L1P ) ∧ L1(¬L1P ∨Q)) ∨R
↓
((L2P ∨ L1¬L1P ∨ L1⊥) ∧ (¬L1P ∨ L1Q ∨ L1⊥)) ∨R
↓
((L2P ∨ ¬L1P ∨ L1⊥ ∨ L1⊥) ∧ (¬L1P ∨ L1Q ∨ L1⊥)) ∨R
↓
(L2P ∨ ¬L1P ∨ L1⊥ ∨R) ∧ (¬L1P ∨ L1Q ∨ L1⊥ ∨R)
↓
(L1P ∧ ¬L1⊥ ∧ ¬L2P ⊃ R) ∧ (L1P ∧ ¬L1Q ∧ ¬L1⊥ ⊃ R)
Fig. 1. An example of translation into a clausal form.
where ai, bi,j, c ∈ L0, and each element of the conjunction in the antecedent
may not exist. A theory which is a n-tuple of a set of normal form formulas
is also called to be in normal form.
By Theorem 2.9 (1) again, we can replace the subformula Liai,1 ∧ . . . ∧
Liai,l(i) in clausal form with Li(ai,1 ∧ . . . ∧ ai,l(i)), so that it is obvious that
there exists an equivalent normal form for any clausal form formula. Thus, we
can immediately obtain the following theorem, which is a natural extension of
the result in [11] to the case of multi-agents.
Theorem 2.11 Any theory can be translated into a normal form theory with-
out changing its extensions.
Note that any nest of modal operators does not occur in normal form
formula. Thus, we can remove them without changing its meaning.
In the following, we assume that a theory is in normal form.
2.4 Stable Model Semantics of Logic Program
In this section, we deﬁne a stable model of a logic program with integrity
constrains as the same way as [18]. We assume that all the variables occurred
in program rules are grounded.
Deﬁnition 2.12 Let Ai(i = 0, . . . , n) be an atom. A logic program is a set of
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program rules of the form
A0 ← A1, . . . , Am, notAm+1, . . . , notAn.
where 0 ≤ m ≤ n. A0 is a head of the rule and A1, . . . , Am, notAm+1, . . . , notAn
are bodies of it.
Deﬁnition 2.13 An integrity constraint is a program rule where the head is
a special atom false which denotes incoherence.
Deﬁnition 2.14 Let P be a logic program with integrity constraints. A stable
model of P is a set S of atoms which satisﬁes the following conditions (1) and
(2):
(1) S coincides with a minimal model of reduct(P, S) which is a deﬁnite logic
program obtained from P by the following procedures (a) and (b).
(a) Remove all rules such that {Am+1, . . . , An} ∩ S = ∅ from P .
(b) Remove all negative literals notAm+1, . . . , notAn from the bodies of the
remaining rules.
(2) false /∈ S. 1
3 Extension Bases
In this section, we deﬁne a ﬁxed point which characterizes extensions of a
theory, where the formulas to which the modal operators in the theory refer
play important roles.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a normal form theory. A theory
LP = (LP1 , . . . ,LPn) which is deﬁned as follows is a test domain of P :
LPi = {q | Liq occurs in
n⋃
j=1
Pj} (i = 1, . . . , n) .
Since formulas in P are assumed to be in normal forms, LPi ⊆ L0.
From this deﬁnition, if a theory P is consisted of ﬁnite sets of formulas,
LP is also ﬁnite.
Next, for a normal form theory, we deﬁne a ﬁxed point which is a subset
of the test domain of it.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a normal form theory and LP =
(LP1 , . . . ,LPn) be a test domain of P . Then a theory B = (B1, . . . , Bn) such
that
Bi = {q ∈ LPi | Pi |=B q} (i = 1, . . . , n)
is an extension base of P .
1 The condition (2) can be deleted if we add “odd loop”
false′ ← not false′, false.
to the logic program, where false′ is an atom which never occurs in other rules.
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Theorem 3.3 Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a normal form theory and LP =
(LP1 , . . . ,LPn) be a test domain of P . Then there exists one-to-one corre-
spondence between extensions and extension bases of P . An extension T =
(T1, . . . , Tn) and an extension base B = (B1, . . . , Bn) which correspond to each
other satisfy Ti ∩ LPi = Bi (i = 1, . . . , n).
This theorem shows the fact that extensions of a theory can be character-
ized in terms of the condition that whether the formulas to which the modal
operators in the theory refer belong to the extension of it or not.
Example 3.4 Consider Example 2.7 again. To be a theory P a triple of ﬁnite
sets of formulas, we restrict the attributes to be inherited as follows:
P1 = {Paciﬁst} ,
P2 = {¬Paciﬁst} ,
P3 = {L1Paciﬁst ∧ ¬L3¬Paciﬁst ⊃ Paciﬁst ,
L2¬Paciﬁst ∧ ¬L3¬¬Paciﬁst ⊃ ¬Paciﬁst} .
As well as Example 2.7, P = (P1, P2, P3) has two extensions. The test domain
of P is
LP = (LP1 ,LP2 ,LP3)
= ({Paciﬁst}, {¬Paciﬁst}, {¬Paciﬁst,¬¬Paciﬁst}) .
In the case that
B = (B1, B2, B3)
= ({Paciﬁst}, {¬Paciﬁst}, {¬¬Paciﬁst}) ,
B is an extension base of P since
{q ∈ LP1 | P1 |=B q } = {Paciﬁst} = B1 ,
{q ∈ LP2 | P2 |=B q } = {¬Paciﬁst} = B2 ,
{q ∈ LP3 | P3 |=B q } = {¬¬Paciﬁst} = B3 .
As the same way,
B′ = (B′1, B
′
2, B
′
3)
= ({Paciﬁst}, {¬Paciﬁst}, {¬Paciﬁst})
is also an extension base of P .
4 Translation from MAEL into Logic Program
In this section, we show a method to translate a normal form theory into a
logic program. We can compute extension bases from this translated logic
program.
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Deﬁnition 4.1 For a normal form theory P = (P1, . . . , Pn), tr(P ) is a logic
program which consists of program rules generated by the following translation
rules (1)–(3):
(1) For any i (i = 1, . . . , n), if
L1a1 ∧ ¬L1b1,1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬L1b1,m(1) ∧ . . .∧
Lnan ∧ ¬Lnbn,1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Lnbn,m(n) ⊃ c ∈ Pi ,
then
fact(i, c)← bel(1, a1), not bel(1, b1,1), . . . , not bel(1, b1,m(1)), . . . ,
bel(n, an), not bel(n, bn,1), . . . , not bel(n, bn,m(n)).
∈ tr(P ) .
(2) For any i (i = 1, . . . , n), if p ∈ LPi and Q = {q1, . . . , qk} is a minimal subset
of CPi such that (Pi ∩ L0) ∪Q |= p,
fact(i, p)← fact(i, q1), . . . , fact(i, qk). ∈ tr(P ) ,
where
CPi = {c | L1a1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Lnbn,m(n) ⊃ c ∈ (Pi − L0)} .
(3) For any i (i = 1, . . . , n), if p ∈ LPi , then
bel(i, p)← not not bel(i, p).
not bel(i, p)← not bel(i, p).
false← bel(i, p), not fact(i, p).
false← not bel(i, p), fact(i, p).


∈ tr(P ) .
We explain the meaning of each type of the program rules.
(1) is a program rule which was translated from a belief or an inference
rule which agent i believes. At this time, new predicates bel, not bel, and
fact are introduced to a logic program, and literals of the form Lip and ¬Lip
are replaced with bel(i, p) and not bel(i, p), respectively. An ordinal atomic
formula p, which does not include modal operators, is replaced with an atom
fact(i, p) if p occurs in Pi.
(2) is a program rule for giving the capability of logical implication to a
logic program since agents are assumed to be logically omniscient. Programs
rules in a logic program can be used only in the right to left direction, so
that it is needed to describe the logical consequence relations as rules clearly.
However, since it is diﬃcult to describe all the relations, we describe only the
parts required for the computation of extension bases. When it is veriﬁed
whether the condition in Deﬁnition 3.2 is satisﬁed, the information about
whether formulas in a test domain LP is derived from each agent’s initial
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belief is needed. Thus, for any agent i (i = 1, . . . , n), only the rules about the
propositional derivability of formulas in LPi from initial beliefs Pi ∩ L0 and
beliefs CPi which may be newly obtained should be described.
(3) is a program rule to for giving the capability of autoepistemic reasoning
to a logic program. First two rules of (3) describe the properties of predicates
bel and not bel, which divide stable models into the one where bel(i, p) holds
and the others where not bel(i, p) holds. This corresponds to the fact that one
of the literals of Lip and ¬Lip holds for any agent i in MAEL. Since these
rules are generated for any formula in a test domain LP , we can take into
consideration all the belief states about whether each agent has a formula in
LP as his belief. This exhaustiveness guarantees that we can obtain all the
extension bases from stable models (completeness).
The last two rules of (3) are integrity constraints which describe that
fact(i, p) have to hold in the models where bel(i, p) holds and that fact(i, p)
does not have to hold in the models where not bel(i, p) holds. Intended mean-
ings of those constraints are the following ones about agents’ beliefs: agent i
can derive a belief p from his initial beliefs by some reasoning (Pi |=B p) if he
has a belief p (p ∈ Bi), and agent i cannot derive a belief p from his initial
beliefs by some reasoning (Pi |=B p) if has a belief p (p /∈ Bi). They become
the constraints that the deﬁnition of an extension base requires if they are re-
stricted to the formulas in a test domain LP . Thus, the existence of these rules
guarantees that a theory obtained from a stable model is surely an extension
base (soundness).
Example 4.2 Consider a translation of a theory P = (P1, P2, P3) in Exam-
ple 3.4 into a logic program. A test domain of P is
LP = ({Paciﬁst}, {¬Paciﬁst}, {¬Paciﬁst,¬¬Paciﬁst})
and we obtain
CP = (CP1 , CP2 , CP3)
= ({ }, { }, {Paciﬁst,¬Paciﬁst}) .
The logic program tr(P ) translated from P is shown in Fig. 2. The rule
fact(3,¬¬Paciﬁst)← fact(3,Paciﬁst).
in (2) describes that agent 3 can also obtain a belief ¬¬Paciﬁst by proposi-
tionally logical reasoning when he obtain a belief Paciﬁst by some reasoning.
Now we give a theorem which shows that reasoning results before and after
the translation correspond to each other.
Deﬁnition 4.3 For a set of formulas Pi and a theory T = (T1, . . . , Tn), we
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(1)


fact(1,Paciﬁst).
fact(2,¬Paciﬁst).
fact(3,Paciﬁst)← bel(1,Paciﬁst), not bel(3,¬Paciﬁst).
fact(3,¬Paciﬁst)← bel(2,¬Paciﬁst), not bel(3,¬¬Paciﬁst).
(2)


fact(1,Paciﬁst).
fact(2,¬Paciﬁst).
fact(3,¬Paciﬁst)← fact(3,¬Paciﬁst).
fact(3,¬¬Paciﬁst)← fact(3,Paciﬁst).
(3)


bel(1,Paciﬁst)← not not bel(1,Paciﬁst).
not bel(1,Paciﬁst)← not bel(1,Paciﬁst).
false← bel(1,Paciﬁst), not fact(1,Paciﬁst).
false← not bel(1,Paciﬁst), fact(1,Paciﬁst).
bel(2,¬Paciﬁst)← not not bel(2,¬Paciﬁst).
not bel(2,¬Paciﬁst)← not bel(2,¬Paciﬁst).
false← bel(2,¬Paciﬁst), not fact(2,¬Paciﬁst).
false← not bel(2,¬Paciﬁst), fact(2,¬Paciﬁst).
bel(3,¬Paciﬁst)← not not bel(3,¬Paciﬁst).
not bel(3,¬Paciﬁst)← not bel(3,¬Paciﬁst).
false← bel(3,¬Paciﬁst), not fact(3,¬Paciﬁst).
false← not bel(3,¬Paciﬁst), fact(3,¬Paciﬁst).
bel(3,¬¬Paciﬁst)← not not bel(3,¬¬Paciﬁst).
not bel(3,¬¬Paciﬁst)← not bel(3,¬¬Paciﬁst).
false← bel(3,¬¬Paciﬁst), not fact(3,¬¬Paciﬁst).
false← not bel(3,¬¬Paciﬁst), fact(3,¬¬Paciﬁst).
Fig. 2. Logic program tr(P ) in Example 4.2
deﬁne an operator reductM as follows:
reductM(Pi, T ) = { c | L1a1 ∧ ¬L1b1,1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬L1b1,m(1) ∧ . . .∧
Lnan ∧ ¬Lnbn,1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Lnbn,m(n) ⊃ c ∈ Pi,
aj ∈ Tj, bj,1, . . . , bj,m(j) /∈ Tj (j = 1, . . . , n) } .
Lemma 4.4 Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a theory, and S be a stable model of
tr(P ). Then there uniquely exists an extension base B = (B1, . . . , Bn) of P
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such that
S =
n⋃
i=1
{bel(i, p) | p ∈ Bi}
∪
n⋃
i=1
{not bel(i, p) | p ∈ (LPi −Bi)}
∪
n⋃
i=1
{fact(i, p) | p ∈ Bi ∪ reductM(Pi, B)} .
Lemma 4.5 Let P = (P1, . . . , Pn) be a theory and B = (B1, . . . , Bn) be an
extension base of P . Then
S =
n⋃
i=1
{bel(i, p) | p ∈ Bi}
∪
n⋃
i=1
{not bel(i, p) | p ∈ (LPi −Bi)}
∪
n⋃
i=1
{fact(i, p) | p ∈ Bi ∪ reductM(Pi, B)}
is a stable model of tr(P ), i.e., S = Treduct(tr(P ),S) ↑ ω.
From these lemmas, we can prove the next result.
Theorem 4.6 Let P be a normal form theory and tr(P ) be a translation from
P . Then there exists one-to-one correspondence between extension bases of P
and stable models of tr(P ). An extension base B = (B1, . . . , Bn) and a stable
model S which correspond to each other satisfy Bi = {p | bel(i, p) ∈ S} (i =
1, . . . , n).
This theorem guarantees that there exists a stable model for any extension
base. Thus, if all the stable models of the logic program translated from
a theory of MAEL are computed, we can obtain all the extension bases of
the theory. Moreover, we can obtain a corresponding extension base from
the stable model by taking out atoms of the form bel(i, p) and taking out
arguments from them.
Example 4.7 There exist two stable models S and S ′ for tr(P ) in Exam-
ple 4.2:
S = { bel(1,Paciﬁst), bel(2,¬Paciﬁst), bel(3,¬¬Paciﬁst),
not bel(3,¬Paciﬁst),
fact(1,Paciﬁst), fact(2,¬Paciﬁst), fact(3,Paciﬁst),
fact(3,¬¬Paciﬁst) } ,
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Logic Program
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1
P
2
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MAEL NF Theory
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T
n
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MAEL Theory
P’ P
T B
Fig. 3. Correspondences between MAEL and Logic Program
S ′ = { bel(1,Paciﬁst), bel(2,¬Paciﬁst), bel(3,¬Paciﬁst),
not bel(3,¬¬Paciﬁst),
fact(1,Paciﬁst), fact(2,¬Paciﬁst), fact(3,¬Paciﬁst) } .
An extension base B which corresponds to S is
B = ({Paciﬁst}, {¬Paciﬁst}, {¬¬Paciﬁst}) .
On the other hand, an extension base B′ which corresponds to S ′ is
B′ = ({Paciﬁst}, {¬Paciﬁst}, {¬Paciﬁst}) .
This result coincides with Example 3.4. Since stable models of tr(P ) do not
exist except S and S ′, extension bases of P do not exist except B and B′ by
Theorem 4.6. Moreover, by Theorem 3.3, there does not exist extensions of P
except T and T ′ which correspond to B and B′, respectively.
All correspondences shown in this paper are illustrated in Fig. 3.
5 Discussions
In this section, we discuss the properties of reasoning in MAEL and the rela-
tions to previous studies through the translation proposed in this paper.
5.1 Relations to Junker’s Result
Junker[10] has proposed a method that reduces the computation of extensions
of default logic and AEL to the one of TMS. Since it is known that semantics
of TMS coincides with stable model semantics of a logic program[2], Junker’s
method can be considered to be a translation method from default logic and
AEL to logic programming. Taking into accounts of the characteristics of
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TMS, i.e., ﬁniteness and the lack of the logical reasoning capability, Junker
showed that extensions of a theory of default logic and AEL are characterized
in terms of the ﬁnite extension bases and proposed a description of justiﬁ-
cations which can compute the extension bases. In fact, extension bases in
MAEL and program rules (1) and (2) in Deﬁnition 4.1 are deﬁned by naturally
extending Junker’s result to multi-agent systems.
Junker’s TMS for computing extensions of AEL, however, does not corre-
spond to stable model semantics of logic program since he has changed seman-
tics of TMS so that circulation of justiﬁcations may be allowed. On the other
hand, without changing both semantics of MAEL and stable model semantics
of logic programs, we have associated these two systems directly in this pa-
per. The reason that this became possible is that weakly-groundedness[11] of
semantics of MAEL is described in terms of program rules (see Section 5.4).
5.2 Characterization of Extensions by Finite Theory
According to Deﬁnition 2.5, any extension of a theory of MAEL becomes the
one which contains inﬁnite number of formulas. However, if a theory is a ﬁnite
set of formulas, an extension of the theory can be characterized in terms of
its ﬁnite subset. Characterization of extensions in terms of extension bases
deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.2 is a method to do this.
Although the translation method in this paper does not require the ﬁnite-
ness of a theory of MAEL, the translated logic program will contain inﬁnite
number of program rules if the theory is inﬁnite. On the other hand, the
computing systems for stable models[1,15] require the ﬁniteness of a logic
program. Thus, when we consider the computation of stable models of the
translated logic program by using existing systems, it is desirable to gener-
ate a ﬁnite logic program for a theory whose extensions can be characterized
ﬁnitely. The translation method in this paper shows that the translated logic
program become ﬁnite if a theory of MAEL is ﬁnite.
5.3 Relations to Abduction
Satoh[18] has proposed a method which reduces a computation of explanations
in the abductive framework to a computation of stable models. He called an
atom which can be used as a hypothesis abducible, and the following rule pair
is given for any abducible p:
p← not p˜.
p˜← not p.
This rule pair divides stable models into the ones where p holds and the
others where p˜ holds. In the formers, p holds as a hypothesis without any
other conditions.
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The ﬁrst two rules generated by the translation rule (3) in Deﬁnition 4.1
are in the same forms as this rule pair. In fact, the intension of giving the
rules is to make a model which admits bel(i, p), that is, bel(i, p) is regarded as
an abducible.
The translation method in this paper can be considered to be based on the
viewpoints of abduction since the reasoning formalized in MAEL is as follows:
(i) Either a meta belief Lip or ¬Lip is assumed to be held.
(ii) It is veriﬁed whether the assumption in (i) satisﬁes the stability of a theory.
The translation rule (3) describes this view in terms of program rules, where
(i) is described by using the representation method of abducibles which Satoh
has proposed, and (ii) is described by using integrity constraints.
5.4 Semantics with Weakly-Groundedness
As mentioned in Section 5.3, the method to regard not only ¬Lip but Lip
as assumptions is needed to describe weakly-groundedness[11] of semantics of
MAEL. Roughly speaking, weakly-groundedness means that circulated jus-
tiﬁcation of beliefs is allowed. For example, MAEL gives two extensions
T = ({¬L1p, . . .}) and T ′ = ({p, L1p, . . .}) for a theory P = ({L1p ⊃ p}).
Thus, under the semantics which has weakly-groundedness, if agent i can de-
rive p by assuming Lip, then it is valid that he has a belief p. To take into
accounts of this semantics, models of a logic program where the reasoning
begins after once bel(i, p) is accepted were required.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, in order to develop a proof procedure of MAEL, we showed
that the extension computing problem of MAEL can be reduced to the stable
model computing problem of a logic program. To do this, we proposed a trans-
lation method from normal form formulas of MAEL into program rules with
integrity constraints, and proved theorems which guarantee that reasoning re-
sults do not change through this translation. If this translation is available
eﬃciently, then it comes to be able to carry out direct use of the research
results about stable model computation of a logic program in the process of
extension computation of a theory of MAEL.
Furthermore, to clarify the properties of reasoning in MAEL, we charac-
terized semantics of MAEL through the translation. In particular, compar-
ing with [10], we formalized the logic program that can describe the weakly-
groundedness of semantics of MAEL.
As having been discussed on AEL[11], however, weakly-groundedness may
become a factor which brings undesirable reasoning results. Since other se-
mantics which do not have weakly-groundedness are proposed[11,14], applying
them to MAEL is a candidate to solve the problem.
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